Nortel 7.05 - Manual

Nortel 7.05

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Table of Contents:

  • Page 2 – Revision History; Version
  • Page 3 – Table of Contents
  • Page 4 – Table of Figures
  • Page 5 – Security Target Introduction; Acronyms (Section 9) – Defines the acronyms used within this ST.; Security Target, TOE and CC Identification and Conformance
  • Page 6 – bold text; be considered as a refinement.; Table 2 - Terminology; Term
  • Page 8 – TOE Description; Product Description; Figure 1
  • Page 9 – Figure 2
  • Page 10 – TOE Boundaries and Scope; Figure 3 - Physical TOE Boundary
  • Page 11 – Nortel VPN Router
  • Page 12 – Figure 5 - TOE Logical Boundary; The essential logical components of the TOE are:
  • Page 13 – Nortel VPN Client Workstation:
  • Page 14 – Identification and Authentication; The GUI and CLI accepts username/password authentication.; Security Management; The TOE maintains three main user roles:; Protection of the TOE Security Functions
  • Page 16 – TOE Security Environment; Threats to Security
  • Page 17 – Attackers who are not TOE users:; These attackers have no knowledge of how the TOE operates and are; Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment; The following threats are addressed by the TOE environment:
  • Page 18 – Security Objectives; Security Objectives for the TOE; The specific security objectives are as follows:
  • Page 19 – Security Objectives for the Environment
  • Page 20 – IT Security Requirements; TOE Security Functional Requirements; Table 3 - TOE Security Functional Requirements; SFR ID
  • Page 22 – Table 4 - Auditable Events; Event
  • Page 24 – ] and specified cryptographic key sizes [; FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction; zeroization; Cryptographic operation (encryption and decryption)
  • Page 25 – Cryptographic operation (authentication)
  • Page 27 – Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control; FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control; The TSF shall enforce the [; FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
  • Page 29 – FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
  • Page 30 – FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality; The TSF shall enforce the [
  • Page 31 – The TSF shall allow [; FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms; The TSF shall provide [; Dependencies: No dependencies; User identification before any action
  • Page 32 – TSF-mediated actions on
  • Page 33 – Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions; Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
  • Page 35 – FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions; Dependencies: No Dependencies
  • Page 36 – The TSF shall maintain the roles [
  • Page 37 – The TSF shall run a suite of tests [; The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: [; The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [
  • Page 38 – The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [
  • Page 39 – Security Functional Requirements on the IT Environment; Table 5 - IT Environment Security Functional Requirements
  • Page 40 – The TSF; TOE Environment; shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for it’s; the TOE’s
  • Page 41 – Table 6 - Assurance Components; Assurance Requirements
  • Page 42 – TOE Summary Specification; TOE Security Functions; TOE Security
  • Page 43 – Accounting Logs
  • Page 44 – System Log
  • Page 45 – Table 8 - FIPS Validated Modules; Validation; Table 9 - FIPS-Validated Cryptographic Algorithms; Algorithm
  • Page 46 – TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied:; The TOE enforces the VPN Information Flow Control SFP by allowing; Firewall Information Flow Control SFP:; The TOE enforces the Firewall Information Flow Control SFP by
  • Page 47 – Both SFPs enforce a; Identification and Authentication; Cryptographic functions relevant to the use of digital; TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied:; See Footnote 3 for more information.
  • Page 48 – Protection of the TOE Security Functions; Software Integrity Check:; Verifies the correct operation of the FIPS 186-2; Alternating Bypass Mode Test:; Verifies that the Approved RNG is not failing to a constant value.
  • Page 49 – Continuous RNG for Entropy Gathering:; TOE Security Assurance Measures; Assurance
  • Page 50 – Augmentation to EAL 4+ assurance level.
  • Page 51 – Protection Profile Claims; Protection Profile Reference; There are no protection profile claims for this security target.
  • Page 52 – Rationale; Security Objectives Rationale; Table 11 - Relationship of Security Threats to Objectives; TOE Objectives
  • Page 54 – OE.TIME ensures that this threat is removed.
  • Page 55 – OE.CERTIFICATE satisfies this assumption.; Security Functional Requirements Rationale
  • Page 56 – Table 12 - Relationship of Security Requirements to Objectives; Objectives
  • Page 58 – RFC; sessions with the TOE using IPSec protocol.; Access Control SFP
  • Page 59 – information flow control SFP
  • Page 60 – succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.; Security Assurance Requirements Rationale; Table 13 - Functional Requirements Dependencies
  • Page 62 – TOE Summary Specification Rationale; Requirements
  • Page 63 – Configuration Management; Secure Delivery and Operation; Corresponding CC Assurance Components:; Development
  • Page 64 – Guidance Documentation
  • Page 65 – Vulnerability and TOE Strength of Function Analyses; Strength of Function
  • Page 66 – Acronyms
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© 2008 Nortel Networks

Nortel Networks

VPN Router v7.05 and Client

Workstation v7.11



Security Target

Evaluation Assurance Level: EAL 4+

Document Version: 3.9


Prepared for:

Prepared by:

Nortel Networks

Corsec Security, Inc.

600 Technology Park Drive

Billerica, MA 01821

10340 Democracy Lane, Suite 201

Fairfax, VA 22030

Phone: (800) 466-7835

Phone: (703) 267-6050

http://www.nortel.com

http://www.corsec.com

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Summary

Page 2 - Revision History; Version

Security Target, Version 3.9 March 18, 2008 Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11 Page 2 of 67 © 2008 Nortel Networks Revision History Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes 1.0 2005-05-31 Kiran Kadambari Initial draft. 2.0 2006-01-17 Nathan Lee Revised to use ne...

Page 3 - Table of Contents

Security Target, Version 3.9 March 18, 2008 Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11 Page 3 of 67 © 2008 Nortel Networks Table of Contents REVISION HISTORY .......................................................................................................................................

Page 4 - Table of Figures

Security Target, Version 3.9 March 18, 2008 Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11 Page 4 of 67 © 2008 Nortel Networks 7 PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS ............................................................................................................... 51 7.1 P ROTECTION P ROFILE...

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